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At the beginning of the #MeToo movement, victims of sexual 
assault and harassment used that hashtag across various social 
media platforms to share their personal stories. As those posts took 
over social media, it became clear just how pervasive this problem 
is. The movement challenged companies, organizations, politicians, 
individuals, and the legal system to do something more than they 
had done in the past to account for and remedy this problem. 
The lesser known #MeTooK12 movement, an offshoot of 
#MeToo, tried to shed light on the sexual harassment of children in 
schools.1 According to an American Association of University 
Women (AAUW) survey, more than 80% of students will be victims 
of sexual harassment before they graduate from high school,2 
mostly from other students.3 Not only does this sexual harassment 
“leave [its] victims with deep and lasting scars,” but the problem 
also “prevails in adulthood because these behaviors aren’t being 
addressed in childhood—a pivotal time when kids are learning 
social norms and developing their sense of identity.”4 
Title IX liability for student-on-student sexual harassment 
incentivizes schools to take some action about this problem. And 
hopefully genuine care for students further incentivizes schools. 
However, the prevalence of sexual harassment in schools calls into 
question how well Title IX liability and other motivations are 
driving schools to help curtail this problem. 
This Note examines the current Title IX liability standards for 
student-on-student sexual harassment and argues that those 
standards need to be supplemented by mandatory education about 
sexual harassment, both for educators and for students. Part I 
provides an overview of the current Title IX liability standards and 
their limitations for student-on-student sexual harassment. Part II 
argues that the presumptions underlying the standards are barriers 
 
 1. Valerie Strauss, #MeTooK12: A New Hashtag for Students Sexually Assaulted or 
Harassed in K-12 Schools, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2018, 11:51 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/01/03/metook12-a-
new-hashtag-for-students-sexually-assaulted-or-harassed-in-k-12-schools/. 
 2. Catherine Hill & Holly Kearl, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School, AM. 
ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN 10 (2011), https://www.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/ 
Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassment-at-School.pdf. 
 3. Id. at 3. 
 4. Wendy Lu, What #MeToo Means to Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/well/family/metoo-me-too-teenagers-teens-
adolescents-high-school.html. 
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in the way of reducing the problem. Part III recommends educating 
students and school employees about sexual harassment—what it 
is, what its consequences are, what the school’s policy is, and what 
resources are available to victims. 
If schools teach students that sexual harassment is never 
appropriate and has significant consequences for both the harassed 
and the harasser, those students will be less likely to sexually harass 
each other, less likely to sexually harass people when they enter 
universities and the workforce, and more empowered to respond 
to sexual harassment. 
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: TITLE IX LIABILITY UNDER DAVIS V. 
MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
In 1999, the Supreme Court considered Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, which asked whether students could hold 
schools liable for sex discrimination under Title IX when other 
students harassed them.5 The Court held in Davis that schools were 
liable for sex discrimination under Title IX when the district had 
actual knowledge of and was deliberately indifferent to sexual 
harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that 
it . . . deprive[d] the victims of access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”6 
Cries that the Court had gone too far followed,7 echoing the 
dissent’s lamentation that this decision would make schools liable 
for “immature students,” who “are not fully accountable for their 
actions” and “who are just learning to interact with their peers.”8 
The dissent questioned whether it was even proper to  
“label[] the conduct of fifth graders ‘sexual harassment’ and 
‘gender discrimination.’”9 
Fifth graders were, after all, the center of Davis.10 The petitioner 
alleged that her daughter, LaShonda, had for months been  
 
 5. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The Court had the year 
prior held that schools could be liable when teachers harassed students. Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). 
 6. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 7. E.g., Jennifer C. Braceras, New Menace in the Schools: Hand Holding, WALL ST. J.,  
May 25, 1999, at A26. 
 8. Davis, 526 U.S. at 666, 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 673. 
 10. Id. at 633. 
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“the victim of a prolonged pattern of sexual harassment by one of 
her fifth-grade classmates.”11 The complaint detailed how G.F. 
“attempted to touch LaShonda’s breasts and genital area and made 
vulgar statements such as ‘I want to get in bed with you’ and ‘I want 
to feel your boobs.’”12 During their physical education class, he also 
“purportedly placed a door stop in his pants and proceeded to act 
in a sexually suggestive manner toward LaShonda,” and later he 
“allegedly rubbed his body against LaShonda in the school hallway 
in what LaShonda considered a sexually suggestive manner.”13 
While the Davis dissenters thought it may be inappropriate to 
label such conduct “sexual harassment,” criminal law had no 
problem defining it as such. The student-aggressor actually 
“pleaded guilty to[] sexual battery for his misconduct.”14  
That ended the harassment, but the complaint alleged that it all 
could have ended long before. LaShonda reported the harassment 
to school officials time after time, and according to the complaint, 
the school took “no disciplinary action.”15 Vulnerable as she was, 
she had no help or protection. Her grades dropped, and her father 
found “she had written a suicide note.”16 She was not G.F.’s  
only victim.17 
Prior to Davis, lower courts were split on what, if anything, 
Title IX liability could do about student-on-student sexual 
harassment.18 The Court held in Davis that Title IX could do nothing 
if (1) school officials did not know about the harassment, (2) the 
school’s response was anything short of deliberately indifferent, or 
(3) the harassment was not sufficiently “severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive.”19 The legal protection offered by these 
standards is limited, and this sort of sexual harassment remains just 
as prevalent two decades after Davis.20 The next Sections provide 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 13. Id. at 634. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 633–35. 
 16. Id. at 634. 
 17. Id. at 635. 
 18. Id. at 637. 
 19. Id. at 650. 
 20. Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual 
Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2041 (2016) [hereinafter Mackinnon,  
In Their Hands]. 
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an overview of the actual knowledge, severity, and deliberate 
indifference standards. 
A. Overview of “Actual Knowledge” Standard 
Before Davis, some federal courts were using the constructive 
notice standard, meaning liability attached when schools either 
knew or should have known about the discrimination.21 These 
courts borrowed this standard from the Title VII co-worker sexual 
harassment context.22 If adult employees have legally accepted 
reasons for not reporting harassment prior to filing a Title VII suit, 
“why, then, [would] we require children to confront the adults in 
their schools, even when pervasive and repeated harassment 
already occurs in the presence of adults?”23 It makes implicit sense 
that a school should be responsible—at some level—to actively 
discover the harassment happening by and to its students, 
particularly when it is happening in classrooms and hallways. 
The Court in Davis rejected the constructive notice theory. It had 
already held that in the context of teacher-student sexual 
harassment, Title IX liability only attached when the school had 
“actual knowledge” of the harassment.24 The Court transplanted 
that same standard to Davis.25 According to the Court’s reasoning, 
actual knowledge is necessary because a school is not held liable for 
the harasser’s actions but for the school’s actions. The school’s 
action or inaction in response to harassment may be discrimination 
on the basis of sex, which Title IX expressly forbids.26 If the school 
 
 21. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 958 (4th Cir. 
1997); Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 479 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole M. v. 
Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Franks v. Ky. Sch. for 
the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 748 (E.D. Ky. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 
1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 22. EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515–16 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The prevailing 
trend of the case law . . . seems to hold that employers are liable for failing to remedy or 
prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management-level employees 
knew, or in exercise of reasonable care should have known.”); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, 
F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (“[A]bsence of notice to an employer does not 
necessarily insulate that employer from liability.”). 
 23. Heather D. Redmond, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: Scant 
Protection for the Student Body, 18 LAW & INEQ.: J. THEORY & PRAC. 393, 414 (2000). 
 24. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
 25. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999) (citing Gebser,  
524 U.S. at 290). 
 26. Id. at 640–41; 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
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does not know about the harassment, the school cannot respond to 
the harassment and cannot, therefore, discriminate against  
the victim. 
However, Davis does not specify who within the school must 
actually know—leaving lower courts to assume that the same rule 
from the teacher-student context applies.27 In Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, the Court held that for a school to be 
liable when a teacher harasses a student, an “appropriate person” 
must know.28 That person must be someone who has the “authority 
to take corrective action to end the discrimination.”29 Thus, if a 
teacher is harassing a student, the teacher’s own knowledge of his 
or her actions does not give the school requisite notice. And if only 
a fellow teacher knows, the school still does not actually know 
because the fellow teacher cannot institute corrective action.30 
In the student-on-student harassment context, courts have been 
reluctant to hold that teachers are appropriate officials per se.31 In 
one of earliest applications of Davis,32 the Tenth Circuit recognized 
that “[i]t is possible that . . . teachers would also meet the definition 
of ‘appropriate persons’ for the purposes of Title IX liability if they 
exercised control over the harasser and the context in which the 
harassment occurred,”33 but it explicitly “decline[d] simply to name 
job titles that would or would not adequately satisfy [the actual 
knowledge] requirement.”34 Instead, the Tenth Circuit explained 
that it is “a fact-based inquiry” because school districts assign 
different responsibilities to different employees.35 Davis did 
however establish, according to the Tenth Circuit, “that a school 
 
 27. See, e.g., Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 28. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289–90. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Baynard v. Lawson, 112 F. Supp. 2d 524, 533–34 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding 
that a principal who could not suspend teachers was not an appropriate official even if the 
principal could limit contact or arrange meetings to address the harassment); Nelson v. 
Lancaster Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 356, No. 00-2079, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30393, at *14–15  
(D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2002) (finding because a teacher, bus driver, and custodian were all who 
may have known about a bus driver’s sexual relationship with a minor student, the school 
district was not liable). 
 31. See, e.g., Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247. 
 32. The Tenth Circuit had already heard oral argument for Murrell before the Supreme 
Court’s Davis ruling. Id. at 1245. 
 33. Id. at 1248. 
 34. Id. at 1247. 
 35. Id. 
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official who has the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps by 
measures such as transferring the harassing student to a different 
class, suspending him, curtailing his privileges, or providing 
additional supervision, would meet this definition.”36 
Still, it is uncertain under the case law whether teachers, let 
alone other adult school employees, are appropriate officials.  
“A teacher or other school official could, under this standard, 
ignore blatant sexual harassment occurring within the classroom, 
unless the victim of the misconduct officially notified the 
appropriate authority in the school.”37 Limiting liability to only the 
situations when the right person actually knows perversely encourages 
schools to not train their employees about reporting peer sexual 
harassment to school administrators and to not explain to their 
students the proper way to report Title IX complaints. 
In 2018, the Department of Education proposed new Title IX 
regulations, which included a provision to make primary and 
secondary teachers appropriate officials.38 In its final form, which 
took effect in 2020, that particular rule made every employee in 
elementary and secondary schools an appropriate official.39 This 
corrects the problem temporarily at least. However, the new 
regulations as a whole (not specifically the rule that makes every 
employee an appropriate official) drew intense criticism both 
before and after they took effect,40 and President Joe Biden vowed 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Redmond, supra note 23, at 415. 
 38. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61467 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (codified at  
34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 39. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Finance Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.30 (2020) (“Actual knowledge means 
notice of sexual harassment or allegations of sexual harassment . . . to any employee of an 
elementary or secondary school.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Dog Whistles and Beachheads: The Trump 
Administration, Sexual Violence, and Student Discipline in Education, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 
306 (arguing DeVos’s agenda is “to use Title IX . . . in a larger war on civil rights and equal 
educational opportunity”); Jeannie Suk Gersen, Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title 
IX and Sexual Assault, NEW YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/assessing-betsy-devos-proposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault 
(explaining that the “response from liberals has ranged from skepticism to denunciation”); 
Valerie Strauss, Betsy DeVos’s Controversial New Rule on Campus Sexual Assault Goes into Effect, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/08/14/ 
betsy-devoss-controversial-new-rule-campus-sexual-assault-goes-into-effect/ (describing 
reactions to the regulation changes). For more about the full scope of the regulation changes, 
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during his candidacy to undo them.41 There is a chance that the 
appropriate official rule could get tossed out when the Biden 
administration delivers on the promise to undo the Trump 
administration’s controversial Title IX regulation changes. 
B. Overview of “Deliberate Indifference” Standard 
The next standard that a student must overcome in a suit 
against his or her school is that of “deliberate indifference.” The 
Court in Davis emphasized that a school is not held liable for the 
harasser’s actions but for the school’s actions.42 It “may be liable in 
damages under Title IX only for its own misconduct.”43 That 
misconduct is “deliberate indifference” to the harassment. When a 
school responds with deliberate indifference, the school 
discriminates against the victim student on the basis of sex.44 
Davis did not outline right and wrong responses, explaining 
precisely what a school should do when a student reports 
harassment. Rather, the Court “stress[ed] that [its] conclusion 
here . . . does not mean that recipients can avoid liability only by 
purging their schools of actionable peer harassment or that 
administrators must engage in particular disciplinary action.”45 
Victims cannot prescribe the exact ways that schools address and 
correct the harassment, and courts are not supposed to “second-
guess[] the disciplinary decisions made by school 
administrators.”46 Thus, Davis explains that a school is deliberately 
indifferent only when its “response to the harassment or lack 
thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances.”47 
This standard has done little to prevent sexual harassment in 
schools and has instead “permit[ted] a wide margin of tolerance for 
 
see R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual 
Misconduct, BROOKINGS (June 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-
the-department-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/. 
 41. Bianca Quilantan, Biden Vows ‘Quick End’ to DeVos’ Sexual Misconduct Rule, 
POLITICO (May 7, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/06/biden-vows-a-
quick-end-to-devos-sexual-misconduct-rule-241715. 
 42. See supra Section I.A. 
 43. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 645 (“[T]he deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause students to 
undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it.”) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 648. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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sexual abuse.”48 Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues that in the 
decades since Davis, “the deliberate indifference standard has 
repeatedly and disproportionately been deployed against 
survivors’ cases” even when the schools’ responses are 
“concededly callous, incompetent, unresponsive, inept, and 
inapt.”49 Not only does the standard disadvantage victims in their 
Title IX suits but it also has allowed schools to take no constructive 
steps to reduce the problem. “[O]verall data on the occurrence of 
sexual abuse in schools has not moved an inch” since Davis, 
suggesting that schools held to a deliberate indifference standard 
are not actually addressing the problem.50 
That said, some schools are not deliberately indifferent and 
respond effectively to sexual harassment reports. Good responses 
have a number of positive results, including supporting the victims 
and preventing repeat harassment. When a school responds well,51 
the school demonstrates to the students its commitment to care for 
and protect its students. For instance, the school in I.L. v. Houston 
Independent School District immediately investigated when a 
student reported being sexually assaulted by another student.52 The 
school then “implemented remedial measures that were almost 
entirely successful in eliminating any contact between the students 
and prevented future sexual contact or harassment.”53 The school 
chose not to formally discipline the student-aggressor until the 
police investigation concluded, but in the meantime, the separation 
plan worked well.54 The victim and alleged aggressor “never came 
into contact except for an occasion when they inadvertently 
 
 48. MacKinnon, In Their Hands, supra note 20, at 2041; see also Redmond, supra note 23, 
at 415–16 (arguing that the deliberate indifference standard is too narrow). 
 49. MacKinnon, In Their Hands, supra note 20, at 2040–41 (footnote omitted). 
 50. Id. at 2041. 
 51. Responding well does not mean responding to every allegation with prompt, 
severe punishment of the alleged aggressor. These alleged student-aggressors have due 
process rights that schools have to consider. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629, 665, 682 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that schools are limited by due 
process in disciplining students accused of sexual harassment). What due process should 
look like in this context is heavily debated, and this Note does not address these arguments, 
focusing instead on other changes that can be made to decrease the incidents of sexual 
harassment in schools—for the benefit of both the victims and those who would otherwise 
sexually harass their peers. 
 52. I.L. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 776 Fed. App’x. 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 840. 
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bumped into each other in a school staircase.”55 School officials also 
reached out to the victim multiple times during the school year to 
offer her support and ask how she was doing.56 
Unfortunately, other school officials may egregiously fail to 
even consider addressing very real and serious harassment. For 
instance, in Hill v. Cundiff, the principal had enacted a policy that 
“students had to be ‘caught in the act’ of sexual harassment to 
impose discipline.”57 Instead of responding to and properly 
investigating legitimate allegations of sexual harassment, school 
officials repeatedly dismissed a student-aggressor’s harassment of 
female students.58 Eventually, an aide who had reported the 
harassment to the principal before with no success decided to 
arrange a sting operation, using eighth-grade student Jane Doe as 
bait.59 The plan left the student-aggressor and Jane Doe in the 
bathroom while the school officials stumbled over which bathroom 
to search and who should search.60 The first teacher to finally go 
into the bathroom left after seeing “two pairs of feet ‘close together’ 
beneath the stall.”61 Jane Doe was raped.62 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that a jury could find that the 
school was deliberately indifferent.63 After all, “the [school’s] 
knowledge of [the] sexual harassment, its catch in the act policy, its 
orchestration of a sting operation using Doe as bait . . . , and its 
failure to help Doe in any way was patently odious,” and the only 
policy change after the rape was to “discontinue[] a one-day sexual 
harassment training workshop for administrators.”64 The catch-in-
the-act policy and sting operation led to a horrendous violent crime 
against a vulnerable student, and the school’s next move was to 
 
 55. Id. at 840–41. 
 56. Id. at 840. While the school’s response may have worked for purposes of avoiding 
Title IX liability and for purposes of responsibly addressing sexual harassment in schools, 
the effects of sexual assault cannot be fully remedied by subsequent safety measures, no 
matter how good and responsible they are. In this case, the victim’s mental and physical 
health suffered after the assault, and she eventually transferred to another school. Id. 
 57. Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 958 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 58. Id. at 960. 
 59. Id. at 961. 
 60. Id. at 963. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 973–75. 
 64. Id. at 973 (emphasis added). 
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stop training administrators about sexual harassment. 
Nevertheless, the principal unremorsefully argued that the  
school “did as good a job I think as you could do under  
the circumstances.”65 
C. Overview of Severity Standard 
Finally, the harassment itself must be “so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an 
educational opportunity or benefit.”66 “Whether gender-oriented 
conduct rises to the level of actionable ‘harassment’ thus ‘depends 
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships,’ including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser 
and the victim and the number of individuals involved.”67 
One of the primary disagreements between the majority and 
dissent in Davis was whether Congress intended Title IX to create 
this cause of action. The dissent emphasized that Spending Clause 
legislation requires that Congress give clear notice of the condition 
placed on spending.68 The majority, recognizing this requirement, 
limited liability to a recipient’s own intentional violations of 
Title IX—hence the actual notice and deliberate indifference 
requirements mentioned earlier.69 Then the majority struck a 
balance between Title IX protections and funding recipients’ 
expectations. The Court held that the harassment must be “so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to 
deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or 
benefits provided by the school”70 because Title IX provides that 
“[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”71 
The Court explained that the clearest example of sufficiently 
severe harassment “would thus involve the overt, physical 
 
 65. Id. at 973–74. 
 66. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 
 67. Id. at 651 (citations omitted) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). 
 68. Id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 640–42 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. at 650. 
 71. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added). 
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deprivation of access to school resources.”72 However, “[i]t is not 
necessary . . . to show physical exclusion.”73 The harassment must 
simply be bad enough that it “undermines and detracts from the 
victims’ education experience, that the victim-students are 
effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and 
opportunities.”74 Davis allows for a claim to be predicated on “a 
single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment,” 
but it prejudices such a claim, saying a single instance is unlikely 
“to rise to this level.”75 
Applying this standard, the Eastern District Court of New York 
concluded that the harassment was not sufficiently severe as a 
matter of law when the student-aggressor “grabbed [the victim] by 
the arm and pressed her against the wall with all of his weight,” 
“touch[ed] her breasts, stomach and legs over clothing, and bit[] her 
neck hard enough to leave a mark.”76 
The severity standard, like the actual knowledge and deliberate 
indifference standards, tolerate too much sexual harassment within 
schools. Schools are not liable for so much of the sexual harassment 
happening regularly in their hallways and classrooms, so if we 
expect schools to start curtailing this problem, then something 
other than Title IX liability needs to incentivize or enforce  
those changes. 
II. PRESUMPTIONS UNDERLYING DAVIS 
Throughout the Davis decision and dissent, the justices relied 
on presumptions regarding children, schools, and harassment’s 
effects. Two decades of hindsight demonstrate that these 
presumptions are deeply flawed even if they were commonly 
believed in the past or are still believed today. This part details the 
Court’s reliance on these implicit presumptions and then examines 
how those presumptions are flawed. 
The presumptions underlying the Davis opinions must be 
understood before positive change can happen. Any plan—be it the 
education plan recommended in Part III or another plan 
 
 72. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 73. Id. at 651. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 652–53. 
 76. Carabello v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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altogether—must avoid the traps of these presumptions or it will 
fare no better than Davis at lowering the rate of sexual harassment 
in schools. 
A. The Court’s Reasoning 
This Note explores four errant presumptions in Davis: 
(1) student sexual harassment is inevitable; (2) the severity 
standard is nonmoving; (3) students and school officials properly 
report harassment; and (4) school officials know best how to  
handle harassment. 
1. Student sexual harassment is inevitable. 
Throughout the majority and dissenting opinions in Davis, 
school children are cast as inevitable harassers. The majority 
believed that only some of the inevitable harassment was sufficient 
for Title IX liability whereas the dissenters questioned “whether it 
[was] either proper or useful to label this immature, childish 
behavior gender discrimination.”77 Still, the presumption that 
children, for the sheer sake that they are children, are innately 
prone to commit this abuse pervades both opinions. 
Rather than calling such problematic behavior “sexual 
harassment,” the dissent elected to call it “immature, childish 
behavior,”78 a “routine problem[] of adolescence,”79 “inappropriate 
behavior,”80 “immature or uncontrollable behavior[],”81 part of the 
“adolescen[t] struggle to express their emerging sexual 
identities,”82 part of the “rough-and-tumble” of school,83 and 
“teasing.”84 While some of these diminishing labels were in the 
context of hypothetical claims, the dissent was not willing to even 
 
 77. Davis, 526 U.S. at 673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 686. 
 80. Id. at 672. 
 81. Id. at 673 (quoting Brief for National School Boards Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 10–11, Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) 
(No. 97-843)). 
 82. Id. at 673. 
 83. Id. (quoting Brief for National School Boards Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 10–11, Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) 
(No. 97-843)). 
 84. Id. at 678. 
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label the specific conduct alleged “sexual harassment”85 even 
though the student-aggressor “pleaded guilty to[] sexual battery 
for his misconduct.”86 After all, the dissent argued, “[t]he law 
recognizes that children—particularly young children—are not 
fully accountable for their actions because they lack the capacity to 
exercise mature judgment.”87 While children are commonly held 
less accountable under the law than adults, that as a justification 
still ignores that the child aggressor in Davis was guilty for sexual 
battery—perhaps the most obvious form of sexual harassment. 
The dissent argued that there is simply too much of this 
behavior for schools to be liable. It references a 1993 AAUW study 
that found “4 out of 5 students (81%) report that they have been the 
target of some form of sexual harassment during their school 
lives.”88 In the dissent’s view, there are too many “practical 
obstacles schools encounter in ensuring that thousands of 
immature students conform their conduct to acceptable norms.”89 
And it is true that public schools have “to educate all students who 
live within defined geographic boundaries,” even the worst of  
the misbehavers.90 
Unfortunately for victims, schools are “the primary locus of 
most children’s social development [and] are rife with 
inappropriate behavior by children who are just learning to interact 
with their peers.”91 “[A] teenager’s romantic overtures to a 
classmate (even when persistent and unwelcome) are an 
inescapable part of adolescence.”92 
While the majority did not talk so brazenly about the 
inevitability of sexual harassment in schools, that presumption still 
underlies the reasoning—both expressly and impliedly. For 
example, the majority directed lower courts to remember that 
“children may regularly interact in a manner that would be 
 
 85. Id. at 674 (“[R]espondents have made a cogent and persuasive argument that the 
type of student conduct alleged by petitioner should not be considered ‘sexual harassment,’ 
much less gender discrimination . . . .”). 
 86. Id. at 634 (majority opinion). 
 87. Id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 680 (quoting ANNE L. BRYANT, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 7 (1993)). 
 89. Id. at 666. 
 90. Id. at 664. 
 91. Id. at 672. 
 92. Id. at 675. 
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unacceptable among adults.”93 The maturity of the student-
aggressor factors into the analysis. The Court emphasized this 
distinction again when it expressly held that “[w]hether gender-
oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable ‘harassment’ . . . 
‘depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships,’ including, but not limited to, the 
ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals 
involved.”94 In this way, the majority distinguished student-on-
student harassment at younger ages from student-on-student 
harassment at older ages. So, while Davis applies for all  
student-on-student harassment, what may be sufficiently severe 
harassment in a university context may not be sufficiently severe in 
a grade-school context. 
Furthermore, the majority impliedly relied on this presumption 
as it explained why a single instance of harassment is very unlikely 
to be sufficiently severe.95 The majority “reconcile[d] the general 
principal that Title IX prohibits official indifference to known peer 
sexual harassment with the practical realities or responding to 
student behavior” and essentially carved out a liability exception 
for single incidents.96 
The reconciliation of the legal principle with the practical reality 
presumes that the practical reality—that children sexually harass 
each other—is inevitable and uncorrectable. 
2. The severity standard is nonmoving. 
The Court also presumes that the severity standard makes 
schools potentially liable for a specific, limited set of behaviors. The 
majority scoffed at the dissent’s accusation that the severity 
standard would, over time, make schools liable for regular school 
teasing and bullying.97 
In its discussion about single instances of harassment, the Court 
indicated that the true test is whether “Congress would have 
thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level.”98  
 
 93. Id. at 651 (majority opinion). 
 94. Id. at 651 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 
(1998)) (emphasis added). 
 95. See id. at 652–53. 
 96. Id. at 653. 
 97. Id. at 652. 
 98. Id. at 652–53. 
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According to the Court, Congress through Title IX intended to 
strike a balance between regular inappropriate schoolyard 
behavior and severe harassment.99 Thus, the measure for whether 
a school’s deliberate indifference is actionable is the severity test: is 
it “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive”?100 Of course, to 
ensure that this standard is nonmoving—that it would ensure to 
include and exclude the same behaviors in 2021 that the 1972 
Congress intended—the Court added other guiding language: 
“[w]hether [it] rises to the level of actionable harassment . . . 
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships.”101 The harassment must  
“den[y] its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is 
designed to protect.”102 The Court believed that this guidance 
would help lower courts match Congress’s intent for schools to be 
liable under Title IX for some—but not all—of the sexual 
harassment they ignored. 
3. Students and school officials properly report harassment. 
The complaint at issue in Davis alleged that each time  
LaShonda was harassed she told at least one teacher and that her 
mother also told the principal.103 The Court presumed that other 
children would do the same—that they would tell their teachers. 
Those teachers then would either handle the harassment or, if they 
did not have that authority, they would tell a school official with 
requisite authority. 
This presumption is most evident in the Court’s discussion on 
the actual knowledge requirement. Remember, the Court explained 
that Title IX made funding recipients liable only for their own 
intentional actions, so the Court refused to extend liability to 
situations where the school did not actually know but should have 
known.104 Of course, if school officials should have known about the 
harassment, the school’s failure to discover the harassment may 
have been intentional. The Court rejected that idea. If the school 
 
 99. Id. at 653. 
 100. Id. at 650. 
 101. Id. at 651 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,  
82 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 652. 
 103. Id. at 633–34. 
 104. Id. at 642; see also supra Section I.A. 
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does not know about the harassment, the fault rests with the victim 
for not telling the school; it does not rest with the school for failure 
to observe and investigate. 
And under the actual knowledge standard, telling a teacher 
may not be enough.105 The Court did not specify whose knowledge 
was the school’s knowledge, leaving it to be “a fact-based 
inquiry”106 into whether the person who knew was “an official of 
the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end 
the discrimination.”107 Perhaps the Court found it unnecessary to 
specify who was an appropriate authority because the Court 
presumed that an adult employee would report such harassment to 
school administrators. Parents, students, and society at large 
entrust school employees with caring for children. The assumption 
is that because teachers care about their students’ well-being, 
teachers without authority to rectify harassment themselves 
promptly report it to someone who could. 
4. Schools officials know best how to handle harassment. 
Finally, the Court presumed that school officials know best how 
to handle sexual harassment in their schools—just as they do other 
behavioral problems.108 Thus, the Court accorded great deference 
to schools’ chosen responses to sexual harassment.109 The majority 
accused the dissent of mischaracterizing the deliberate indifference 
standard as requiring schools to enforce specific rules.110 However, 
the majority maintained that the schools had plenty disciplinary 
discretion: they simply had to “respond to known peer harassment 
in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”111 
The dissent’s position here was that the majority was wrong to 
believe that its decision would not affect school discipline.112  
 
 105. See supra Section I.A. 
 106. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 107. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
 108. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (citing New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985)) 
(“We have ‘repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to 
prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969))). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 649. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 678–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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This of course reaffirms the presumption that school officials best 
know how to handle student-on-student harassment.113 As the 
dissent explained, “[t]he obvious reason for the majority’s 
expressed reluctance to allow courts and litigants to second-guess 
school disciplinary decisions is that school officials are usually in 
the best position to judge the seriousness of alleged harassment and 
to devise an appropriate response.”114 
This presumption does not appear for the first time in Davis. 
“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the 
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, 
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools.”115 In Epperson v. Arkansas, the 
Supreme Court explained that “[c]ourts do not and cannot 
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily 
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values.”116 Furthermore, public 
education is “[b]y and large . . . committed to the control of state 
and local authorities.”117 
B. The Flaws of Davis’s Presumptions 
While the presumptions in Davis may be reasoned, they are 
flawed. That is not to say that the Court was entirely wrong but 
rather that there is a significant gap between protections offered 
under Davis and the protections society does and should expect for 
vulnerable children. 
In recent years, the public has widely discussed sexual 
harassment—its reality, its consequences, prevention methods, and 
the legal and moral responsibilities individuals and organizations 
have to prevent and respond to sexual harassment.118 The #MeToo 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 678. 
 115. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
 116. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., The #MeToo Moment, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/series/ 
metoo-moment (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (Jessica Bennett ed.) (collection of articles 
regarding the #MeToo movement). 
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movement rocked Hollywood,119 news organizations,120 
corporations,121 churches,122 government bodies,123 courts,124 
universities,125 and more. Primary and secondary schools could not 
escape public scrutiny.126 After all, over 80% of students are victims 
of sexual harassment before they leave high school.127 
This public discussion has illuminated the many ways in which 
individuals and organizations have failed to protect people from 
sexual harassment. The #MeToo movement has had and will likely 
continue to have effects on sexual abuse laws broadly128 and on 
Title VII sexual harassment law.129 It will likewise affect Title IX 
harassment law as courts handle more Title IX harassment claims 
and as courts and lawmakers consider the policies behind 
 
 119. See, e.g., Pamela Hutchinson, #MeToo and Hollywood: What’s Changed in the Industry 
a Year On?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/08/ 
metoo-one-year-on-hollywood-reaction. 
 120. See, e.g., Katie Warren & Liz Lane, The Powerful Men in the News Accused of Sexual 
Misconduct, NBC4 WASH. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/national 
-international/The-Powerful-Men-Accused-of-Sexual-Harassment-452785093.html. 
 121. See, e.g., Jeff Green, #MeToo Has Implicated 414 High-Profile Executives and Employees in 
18 Months, TIME (June 25, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://time.com/5321130/414-executives-metoo/. 
 122. See, e.g., Casey Quackenbush, The Religious Community Is Speaking Out Against 
Sexual Violence with #ChurchToo, TIME (Nov. 22, 2017, 1:34 AM), https://time.com/5034546/ 
me-too-church-too-sexual-abuse/. 
 123. See, e.g., Dan Corey, Here’s a List of Political Figures Accused of Sexual Misconduct, 
NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-
misconduct/here-s-list-political-figures-accused-sexual-misconduct-n827821. 
 124. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, CNN Investigation: Sexual Misconduct by Judges Kept Under 
Wraps, CNN POL. (Updated Jan. 26, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/ 
politics/courts-judges-sexual-harassment/index.html. 
 125. See, e.g., Collin Binkley, #MeToo Inspires Wave of Old Misconduct Reports to Colleges, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 13, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/metoo-
inspires-wave-of-old-misconduct-reports-to-colleges. 
 126. See, e.g., Wendy Lu, What #MeToo Means to Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/well/family/metoo-me-too-teenagers-teens-
adolescents-high-school.html. 
 127. Hill & Kearl, supra note 2, at 10. 
 128. E.g., 2019 SOL Summary, CHILD USA, https://childusa.org/2019sol/#c (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2019) (providing an overview of states’ recent laws that lengthen the statutes 
of limitation for child sexual abuse cases); see also Hannah Giorgis, The Biggest Deterrent to 
Reporting Child Sexual Abuse, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
entertainment/archive/2019/06/fixing-statute-limitation-laws-child-sexual-abuse/592627/ 
(discussing how states have reconsidered and modified their statutes of limitation for child 
sexual abuse). 
 129. Cynthia L. Cooper, #MeToo Shakes the Legal Landscape on Sexual Harassment, A.B.A. 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/women/publications/ 
perspectives/2018/summer/metoo-shakes-legal-landscape-sexual-harassment/. 
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harassment laws. Each presumption on which the Court based 
Davis fails in one or more ways to protect children from sexual 
harassment. The following sections will examine why these 
presumptions fail. Understanding the flaws of these presumptions 
will help lawmakers, schools, and citizens know why it is 
important to prevent and remedy student-on-student harassment 
and know how to better protect schoolchildren. 
1. If student-on-student sexual harassment is inevitable, then vulnerable 
children will inevitably be hurt. 
Surely, there is no disputing that school children can be 
immature and inappropriate. They can tease and bully. They can be 
crude and insensitive. They can be cruel. They can be hard to 
manage, especially in large numbers. There is also no disputing that 
children are not held to the same responsibilities as adults are 
under the law. Children are learning and developing, and there is 
more allowance for them to make mistakes during their youth and 
adolescence than there will be when they are adults. 
While the Davis dissent and majority were not wrong in 
recognizing these truths, the presumption that this problem is an 
inevitability fails to consider that children are also incredibly 
vulnerable. Children are the victims. When the Court excluded a 
swath of sexual harassment from Title IX protection,130 the Court 
implicitly accepted the argument, more expressly proffered by the 
dissent,131 that there is just too much sexual harassment in schools 
for there to be more comprehensive harassment protections under 
Title IX. That reasoning accounts for the student-aggressors’ 
propensity to harass but fails to account for the student-victims’ 
vulnerability to harassment. 
More than 80% of students are sexually harassed before they 
complete high school.132 Nearly all of that is student-on-student 
sexual harassment.133 The most common type of sexual harassment 
in schools is verbal, but the AAUW found that in a single school 
year 23% of students—and 33% of female students—in grades 7–12 
 
 130. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999). 
 131. See id. at 672–73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 132. Hill & Kearl, supra note 2, at 10. 
 133. Id. at 3. 
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experienced physical sexual harassment.134 Furthermore, some 
researchers believe that “sexual harassment is so common for girls 
that many fail to recognize it as sexual harassment.”135 
And the consequences are very real. Sexual harassment 
victimization is associated with higher rates of absenteeism, lower 
grades, suicidal ideation, self-harm, substance abuse, eating 
disorders, and the feeling that school is not safe.136 The 
consequences are heightened for girls.137 
Despite sexual harassment’s pervasiveness in schools and its 
serious effects on victims, the Court in Davis, both the majority and 
the dissent, was anything but victim-centered in its analysis. It 
found that the prevalence of student-on-student harassment should 
lessen schools’ liability rather than heighten schools’ 
responsibilities to student-victims. Since Davis, there have been 
many efforts to make laws more victim-centered, especially for 
victims of sex crimes and sexual harassment.138 The #MeToo 
 
 134. Id. at 2, 12. Physical sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual touching, 
physical intimidation in sexual way, flashing, and forced sexual acts. 
 135. Id. at 10. 
 136. Susan Fineran and Larry Bennett, Teenage Peer Sexual Harassment: Implications for 
Social Work Practice in Education, 43 SOC. WORK 55, 55 (1998) (“Many students report school 
performance difficulties as a result of sexual harassment, including absenteeism, decreased 
quality of schoolwork, skipping or dropping classes, lower grades, loss of friends, tardiness, 
and truancy.”); Debbie Chiodo, David A. Wolfe, Claire Crooks, Ray Hughes & Peter Jaffe, 
Impact of Sexual Harassment Victimization by Peers on Subsequent Adolescent Victimization and 
Adjustment: A Longitudinal Study, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 246, 249 (2009) (“[F]or girls, 
sexual harassment victimization [is] associated with elevated risk of . . . suicidal thoughts, 
self harm, maladaptive dieting, early dating, substance use, and [feeling unsafe at] 
school . . . .”). Of course, the dissent in Davis acknowledged the consequences sexual 
harassment has on victims but dismissed those consequences because bullying generally also 
negatively affects victims’ education. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 678 
(1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The obvious difference is that there are no federal 
protections from bullying in schools and there are federal protections from discrimination 
on the basis of sex in schools. 
 137. Chiodo et al., supra note 136 (“With the exception of dieting and self-harm 
behaviors a similar pattern of risk was found for boys . . . . In all cases, the magnitude of the 
impact was smaller for boys than girls.”). 
 138. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(b) (Deering 2019) (“[Universities] shall adopt 
detailed and victim-centered policies and protocols regarding sexual assault, domestic 
violence, dating violence, and stalking involving a student that comport with best practices 
and current professional standards.”) (enacted 2014); M. Isabelle Chaudry, An Analysis of 
Legislative Attempts to Amend the Federal Arbitration Act: What Policy Changes Need to Be 
Implemented for #MeToo Victims, 43 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 215, 246 (2019) (“If Congress amends 
the [Federal Arbitration Act], there are many structural changes that need to be implemented 
in the process to make it more victim centered.”); Alexandra Hunstein Roffman, The 
Evolution and Unintended Consequences of Legal Responses to Childhood Sexual Abuse: Seeking 
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movement has been largely victim-centric, empowering victims to 
share their stories and advocating for more people to believe 
victims. As law and culture has shifted to focus more on victims, 
Davis’s reasoning seems unsatisfactory even if the Court did help 
by at least recognizing the possibility of Title IX liability for  
student-on-student harassment. 
This “kids will be kids” or “boys will be boys”139 logic fails not 
only student-victims but also student-aggressors. Students may 
graduate from high school without learning how deeply wrong and 
impermissible their sexual harassment is.140 They may even be held 
socially, professionally, and politically responsible years later for 
the sexual harassment of their school years, and their excuse may 
simply be that they were young and did not know better.141 Schools 
should teach them better so that they do not, and cannot, rely on 
this excuse that leaves victims deeply hurt and traumatized.142 
 
Justice and Preventions, 34 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 301, 302 (2014) (“That second wave of reforms 
is a much more victim-centered approach and offers the benefit of potentially identifying 
abusers who are still at large by allowing victims to bring claims of childhood sexual abuse 
that would have previously expired.”); Scott Gordon, Calif. Law Offers New Hope for Child 
Sexual Abuse Victims, LAW 360 (Oct. 16, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
1209081/calif-law-offers-new-hope-for-child-sexual-abuse-victims (describing how 
expanding the statute of limitation for victims of child abuse, as a recent California law did, 
is victim-centered and how this issue was brought to the forefront by recent child sexual 
abuse cases); Laura Garcia, Note, “Enough Is Enough”: Examining Due Process in Campus Sexual 
Assault Disciplinary Proceedings Under New York Education Law Article 129-B, 69 RUTGERS U. L. 
REV. 1697, 1722 (2017) (describing New York’s victim-centered requirements imposed  
on colleges). 
 139. Male students are more often harassers than are female students. See Hill & Kearl, 
supra note 2, at 3. 
 140. See Lu, supra note 4 (noting that one reason sexual harassment “prevails in 
adulthood [is] because these behaviors aren’t being addressed in childhood—a pivotal time 
when kids are learning social norms and developing their sense of identity”). 
 141. See, e.g., Jonathan Zimmerman, Is Brett Kavanaugh a Nice Guy? That’s Irrelevant.  
So Is Alleged Sexual Assault as a Teen, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2018, 7:37 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/16/what-kavanaugh-did-teen-
irrelevant-so-whether-hes-nice/1328274002/. 
 142. See, e.g., Samantha Schmidt, Amid Kavanaugh Debate, Teens Push Back Against Adults 
Who Say ‘Boys Will Be Boys’, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2018, 8:15 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/boys-will-be-boys-amid-
kavanaugh-debate-teens-push-back-on-adults-who-are-acting-like-its-no-big-
deal/2018/09/21/072b65ba-bd92-11e8-8792-78719177250f_story.html; Dan Levin, What 
Teenagers Think About the Allegations Against Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/us/brett-kavanaugh-high-school.html. 
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2. Davis’s severity standard will be stretched to its breaking point. 
The dissent in Davis noted that Title IX does not provide “any 
guidance in distinguishing individual cases between actionable 
discrimination and the immature behavior of children and 
adolescents.”143 According to the dissenting justices, Davis’s 
severity standard fails to solve this problem because they predicted 
the standard’s interpretation was “likely to be quite expansive,” as 
courts and juries attempt to assess the severity from a reasonable 
child’s perspective.144 
However, the Davis majority opinion presumes that the severity 
standard will attach Title IX liability only for a limited range of 
harassment—as intended by Congress.145 The irony is that “[g]iven 
the state of gender discrimination law at the time Title IX was 
passed, . . . there is no basis to think that Congress contemplated 
liability for a school’s failure to remedy discriminatory acts  
by students,” particularly sexual harassment.146 Thus, the standard 
is prone to shifts and is unpredictably applied across the  
federal courts. 
Shifts in how society views sexual harassment undoubtedly 
affects how judges and juries understand Davis’s severity standard. 
In an article for the Atlantic, Professor Catharine MacKinnon 
explained that “[a]s #MeToo moves the culture beneath the law of 
sexual abuse, early indications are that some conventional systemic 
legal processes may be shifting too.”147 For instance, she has 
observed that “[s]ome courts are beginning to take explicit account 
 
 143. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 672 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 678. 
 145. Id. at 651–52 (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. at 663 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 120 
F.3d 1390, 1395–1406 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing the legislative history of Title IX and finding 
that Congress did not intend for Title IX liability to extend to student-on-student sexual 
harassment); Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure & Committee on Women in 
the Academic Profession, The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, 102 BULL. AM. ASS’N UNIV. 
PROFESSORS 69, 73–75 (2016), https://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIXreport.pdf (recounting the 
development of sexual harassment liability) [hereinafter AAUP]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Where #MeToo Came From, and Where It’s Going, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2019), [hereinafter 
MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From] https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/ 
03/catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/ (recounting how sexual 
harassment law came into existence). 
 147. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, supra note 146. 
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of the cultural shift in what is ‘reasonable’ to expect of a survivor 
who alleges sexual harassment at work.”148 
Knowing that expectations have radically changed in the last 
few years, Davis’s relatively open severity standard, which says it 
“depends on a constellation of surrounding . . . expectations,”149 is 
anything but static. Juries are more likely now to find harassment 
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,” are more likely to 
find it “denie[d] its victims . . . equal access to education,” are more 
likely to find “a single instance . . . sufficiently severe,” and are less 
likely to view sexual harassment as “simple acts of teasing and 
name-calling.”150 Likewise, judges are going to be less inclined to 
dismiss and grant summary judgment in favor of schools. 
These shifts may be welcome, but they are hardly going to  
be uniform across courts or consistent with Congress’s  
supposed Title IX intent or Davis’s early progeny cases. Shifts will 
likely bring up again the dissent’s concern that schools do not have 
proper notice about the Title IX conditions on their federal funding 
because the schools are relying on past interpretations of the 
severity standard.151 
3. Reporting is not that simple. 
In Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, the Third Circuit vacated 
summary judgment after finding “that a jury could find that [the 
victim of workplace sexual harassment] did not act unreasonably 
under the circumstances” when she did not report.152 The Third 
Circuit noted specifically that the #MeToo movement has shown 
how often sexual harassment victims do not report.153 Victims 
“anticipate negative consequences or fear that the harassers will 
face no reprimand; thus, more often than not, victims choose not to 
report the harassment.”154 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added). 
 150. Id. at 651–52 (explaining the severity requirement). 
 151. See id. at 654–62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the notice requirement  
at length and arguing that there was not sufficient notice that Title IX funding was 
conditioned to recipients’ liability for their insufficient responses to student-on-student 
sexual harassment). 
 152. Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cnty., 895 F.3d 303, 313 (3rd Cir. 2018). 
 153. Id. at 313 n.12. 
 154. Id. 
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Children are even less likely to report harassment.155 Only 9% 
of student sexual harassment victims report the harassment to a 
school employee.156 There are a variety of reasons for this: 
Children are more easily intimidated by the harassing behavior, 
may not recognize a satisfactory redress for harassment, may fear 
isolation from their peers in retaliation for turning in a classmate, 
and may blame themselves for the harassment. . . . [T]hey are also 
less likely to label behavior as harassment and report it to the 
appropriate person.157 
Many students do not report because they believe the school 
will not do anything about it, the harassment will get worse 
because of the report, they do know how to report, or they do not 
know whom to report to.158 There is also a real risk that reporting 
will lead to punishment—for the victim.159 
If they report harassment at all, they might not report it to the 
right person. “Many students and parents will not always report 
the incident to the most powerful official at the school, but instead 
are more likely to report harassment to someone at the school with 
whom they feel comfortable, or who has direct control over the 
classroom.”160 How is a student supposed to know whether a 
teacher is the proper authority to handle the harassment on the 
school’s behalf? 
 
 155. Kelly Dixson Furr, Note, How Well Are the Nation’s Children Protected from Peer 
Harassment at School?: Title IX Liability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1595 (2000). 
 156. Hill & Kearl, supra note 2, at 2. 
 157. Furr, supra note 155, at 1595. 
 158. Letter from Linda Mangel, Regional Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Off. for C.R., to 
Christina Kishimoto, Superintendent, Hawaii State Dep’t of Educ., at 3 (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/10115003-a.pdf. 
 159. See, e.g., Mark Keierleber, The Younger Victims of Sexual Violence in Schools, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/08/the-
younger-victims-of-sexual-violence-in-school/536418/; Courteney Stuart, William Monroe 
Student Suspended After She Reports Being Raped, CBS19 NEWS (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.cbs19news.com/content/news/William-Monroe-student-reports-being-
raped-at-school-506850041.html; Tyler Kingkade, Schools Keep Punishing Girls—Especially 
Students of Color—Who Report Sexual Assaults, and the Trump Administration’s Title IX Reforms 
Won’t Stop It, 74 MILLION (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.the74million.org/article/schools-
keep-punishing-girls-especially-students-of-color-who-report-sexual-assaults-and-the-
trump-administrations-title-ix-reforms-wont-stop-it/. 
 160. Redmond, supra note 23, at 414–15. 
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In L.E. v. Lakeland Joint School District #272, a minor student 
alleged that he was sexually assaulted by his teammates at a cross 
country camp.161 His coach heard he was upset and asked him what 
happened, and the student told him.162 The district argued that the 
coach, who was also a teacher in the district, was not an 
“appropriate person.”163 If that were true,164 who exactly was the 
student supposed to tell after he already told his coach? He likely 
believed that the adult he told would either handle it or tell whoever 
needed telling. Should the law expect him to keep reporting until 
he finally tells the right employee with the authority sufficient for 
Title IX liability? “[W]hy . . . do we require children to confront the 
adults in their schools, even when pervasive and repeated 
harassment already occurs in the presence of adults?”165 
As mentioned earlier, the regulations currently specify that any 
employee is the right employee,166 and hopefully that rule will 
remain through subsequent Title IX regulatory reforms. In the 
absence of such a rule, the burden is on the victim-children to figure 
out whom to tell. 
4. Schools have not stopped sexual harassment. 
Educators are not the sole people responsible for protecting 
children from sexual harassment. And it is unrealistic to believe 
that any third party can eliminate sexual harassment in schools. 
However, courts are deferring to schools’ responses because they 
believe schools are best positioned to resolve student-on-student 
sexual harassment,167 and yet over 80% of students are sexually 
harassed before they graduate from high school.168 Is that the best 
they can do? If it is, can anyone else do better? 
Of course, many schools claim that there is no problem. Indeed, 
79% of public schools reported zero incidents of sexual harassment 
toward their 7–12 grade students during the 2015–2016 school year, 
 
 161. L.E. v. Lakeland Joint Sch. Dist. #272, 403 F. Supp. 3d 888 (D. Idaho 2019). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *11. 
 164. The court did not answer whether the coach was an appropriate person but rather 
held that a reasonable jury could find that he was. Id. 
 165. Redmond, supra note 23, at 414. 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41. 
 167. See supra Section I.A.4. 
 168. Hill & Kearl, supra note 2, at 10. 
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yet the AAUW found that nearly half of all 7–12 grade students are 
sexually harassed within a given school year.169 
The Department of Education investigated the Chicago Public 
Schools District after receiving two Title IX complaints in 2015 and 
2016.170 In June 2018, while the Department of Education was still 
investigating the complaints, the Chicago Tribune began publishing 
a special report about how “Chicago public schools ha[ve] failed to 
protect students from sexual abuse and assault.”171 In September 
2019, the Department of Education completed its investigations of 
the specific complaints and of the District’s management of sexual 
harassment.172 The Department of Education determined that the 
District had violated Title IX regulations.173 The Department found 
that, “[f]or years, the District’s management, handling, and 
oversight of complaints of student on student and adult on student 
sexual harassment have been in a state of disarray, to the great 
detriment of the students the District is responsible for educating.” 
The problems included poorly trained staff; unreliable and 
inadequate investigations; poor record-keeping; and lack of 
prevention efforts, coordination, and administrative review.174 
A New York Times article about the investigation quoted Joel 
Levin, co-founder of Stop Sexual Assault in Schools, predicting 
what the Education Department would find if they investigated 
more schools. He said, “Unfortunately, there are hundreds of 
school districts across the country, large and small, that mismanage 
 
 169. Schools Are Still Underreporting Sexual Harassment and Assault, AM. ASS’N OF 
WOMEN (Nov. 2, 2018), https://ww3.aauw.org/article/schools-still-underreporting-sexual-
harassment-and-assault/. 
 170. Letter from Adele Rapport, Regional Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Off. for C.R., to 
Janice K. Jackson, Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Pub. Sch. Dist. #299, at 1 (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/05151178-
a.pdf?utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_t
erm=. One of the complaints alleged student-on-student harassment, and the other alleged 
teacher-student harassment. Id. 
 171. Betrayed: Updates and Opinion, CHI. TRIB., https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
investigations/ct-betrayed-investigation-20180622-storygallery.html (last updated Feb. 28, 
2019) (series of articles). 
 172. Rapport, supra note 170, at 1. 
 173. Id. at 2. 
 174. Id. 
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reported peer and adult sexual harassment and fail to comply with 
Title IX regulations every day.”175 
Experts say that “many other districts also appear to be failing 
to meet even basic requirements under Title IX . . . to appoint a 
coordinator and publicize their resolution processes.”176 Even 
where there are coordinators, they “juggle their duties alongside 
several others, and few of them get any intensive training on how 
to follow the law—or do right by students dealing with traumatic 
life events.”177 
The Davis standards may even provide perverse incentives for 
districts to not have robust Title IX processes. For instance, if 
liability attaches only when high-level officials know, then the 
district may not want employees who are not “appropriate 
persons” to report incidents up the ladder. Thus, the district might 
strategically not tell employees, parents, or students how to report 
harassment. The less they know, the less likely the district will be 
held liable. This theory may seem overly skeptical of public school 
districts but, ultimately, the incentive is there, and 79% of schools 
are reporting zero incidents of harassment while approximately 
48% of students are sexually harassed in any given school year.178 
Children deserve better. 
III. EDUCATION-FOCUSED REFORM 
Though the severity standard is susceptible to some non-
explicit expansion,179 courts are restricted from changing the Davis 
standards outrightly. Title IX makes federal education funding 
conditional on schools’ compliance.180 As such, the Court crafted 
the Davis standards in a way it found consistent with the Spending 
Clause’s requirement that there be sufficient notice of the  
 
 175. Erica L. Green, Chicago Public Schools Ordered to Toughen Sexual Misconduct Policies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/us/politics/chicago-
schools-sexual-misconduct.html. 
 176. Stephen Sawchuk, Are Schools Prepared to Respond to Sex Abuse? Latest Probe Reveals 
Shortcomings, EDUC. WEEK (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/ 
09/25/sex-abuse-probe-exposes-wider-title-ix.html; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.8. 
 177. Sawchuk, supra note 176. 
 178. See Schools Are Still Underreporting Sexual Harassment and Assault, AM. ASS’N OF 
WOMEN (Nov. 2, 2018), https://ww3.aauw.org/article/schools-still-underreporting-sexual-
harassment-and-assault/. 
 179. Supra Section I.B.2. 
 180. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999). 
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funding’s conditions.181 The dissent insisted that there was not 
sufficient notice of this new form of Title IX liability.182 While this 
argument did not win the day in Davis, it will arise again and more 
strongly if a court were to overtly change the standards. Today 
schools know (or should know) that they are liable under Title IX 
when they are deliberately indifferent to severe sexual harassment 
that they actually knew of, but they do not know they are liable 
under different standards. While there is some room for expansion 
under Davis,183 that expansion can only go so far before creating the 
same notice problem as entirely new standards would. 
While in theory Congress could change the standards with new 
legislation amending Title IX, the divisive fights over due process 
in sexual harassment investigations would likely frustrate any 
attempt to change the standards.184 Furthermore, there is a real 
concern about the numerosity of suits against schools if they could 
be liable for their response to lesser, more prevalent sexual 
harassment. Though this concern may not be victim-focused, there 
is a practical need, as the Court recognized, for limiting liability. 
To effectively decrease the rate of sexual harassment in  
schools, there must be new educational programs working in 
tandem with Title IX to cover the holes left by Davis’s standards  
and presumptions. 
A. The Hole Left by Title IX Liability 
Until 1979, it was not settled what remedies existed for Title IX 
violations.185 That year the Court recognized that victims of sex 
discrimination had an implied right of action under Title IX.186 
“Unfortunately . . . , individual monetary damages can come at the 
expense of the kind of broad, systemic transformation originally 
 
 181. Id. at 637. 
 182. Id. at 654–57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 183. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 184. States could create similar liability. However, this is rather unlikely because they 
would have to waive many of the immunities currently enjoyed by schools under state law. 
See, e.g., School Discipline Laws & Regulations by Category & State, NAT’L CTR. ON SAFE 
SUPPORTIVE LEARNING ENV’TS, https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/discipline-
compendium/choose-state/results?field_sub_category_value=Professional+immunity+or+ 
liability (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (providing an overview of each state’s immunities for 
school employees). 
 185. AAUP, supra note 146, at 72. 
 186. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). 
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envisioned by Title IX.”187 As schools focus on preventing liability, 
they lose focus of the Title IX mandate to end their own 
discriminatory practices. “The idea that there can be civil redress 
for victims of sexual misconduct focuses on the individual 
perpetrator’s misbehavior but does not necessarily address the 
structures of discrimination that make such conduct possible.”188 
Addressing the structures of discrimination will likely fill the 
holes left by Davis. Education about sexual harassment—both for 
students and for school employees—will address those structures 
and fill Title IX gaps. 
In 2001, the Department of Education, issued a guidance 
document for schools on how to handle sexual harassment of 
students.189 Many times, that guidance recommended training 
employees, students, and even communities about sexual 
harassment.190 Yet the reality is that that training is not happening. 
For instance, the Office of Civil Rights investigated the Hawaii 
Department of Education from 2011 until 2018 and found that it did 
not even designate Title IX directors to handle allegations of 
student-on-student sexual harassment.191 The whole state of 
Hawaii was without Title IX directors.192 
A Los Angeles high school student, a victim of student-on-
student harassment, explained that she and her friends feel like 
they are on their own when it comes to sexual harassment.193  
 
 187. AAUP, supra note 146, at 72. 
 188. Id. 
 189. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 
(2001) [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE], https://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf. In 2017, the Department of Education rescinded 
the 2001 guidance document in whole, but they remained in effect until the Title IX 
regulations were changed in 2020. Department of Education Issues New Interim Guidance on 
Campus Sexual Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/ 
news/press-releases/department-education-issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual-
misconduct. This guidance may be restored by the Biden administration. See supra  
notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 190. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21. 
 191. Mangel, supra note 158, at 4–5. 
 192. Id. The Hawaii Department of Education is a single, state-wide school district. 
Id. at 2. It did have someone designated to handle teacher-student sexual harassment 
allegations. Id. at 6. 
 193. Samantha Schmidt, ‘If Not Us, Who Will?’, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/local/teenagers-fight-sexual-
harassment-high-schools-in-metoo-era/. 
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“We haven’t really been taught about what we should say, and 
what we should do,” she said.194 “[T]hey just don’t tell us.”195 
Of course, the Title IX regulations do require that schools 
designate an employee to handle Title IX complaints, tell students 
who that employee is, and tell students what the school’s complaint 
procedure is.196 But as the Los Angeles student and the Chicago and 
Hawaii investigations show, that bare minimum requirement is not 
often met. 
When the AAUW asked students what they wanted schools to 
do about sexual harassment, many responded that they wanted a 
designated person to talk to about sexual harassment, online 
resources, and class discussions.197 Some states’ sex education 
programs do include discussion about healthy relationships, self-
discipline, refusal skills, personal boundaries, consent, and 
violence prevention.198 However, even the best of these programs 
are not focused on sexual harassment prevention but rather are 
included in comprehensive sexual education courses that cover a 
high number of important issues.199 For instance, in California, sex 
education is taught only once in junior high and once in high school 
and includes topics such as sexually transmitted diseases, local 
sexual and reproductive health resources, contraception, parenting, 
adoption, abortion, prenatal care, sexual harassment, sexual 
assault, relationship abuse, and sex trafficking.200 
Education about sexual harassment should certainly be 
included in sex education courses, but it needs to exist outside of 
those courses as well. If training students about sexual harassment 
is tangled in sex education reform battles, it may never happen. 
Furthermore, sex education courses are not taught to all students 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (2020). 
 197. Hill & Kearl, supra note 2, at 4. 
 198. Sex and HIV Education, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/sex-and-hiv-education (last updated Sept. 1, 2020) (overview of state laws 
and policies concerning sex education). 
 199. See Stephen Sawchuk, Could the #MeToo Movement Change Sex Ed?, EDUC. WEEK 
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/01/26/what-do-schools-teach-
about-sexual-harassment.html. 
 200. A.B. 329, 2015 Leg. (Cal. 2015); see also Melissa Goodman, Let’s Stop Sexual 
Harassment and Violence Before They Begin with Comprehensive Sex Ed, ACLU (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-education/lets-stop-sexual-
harassment-and-violence-they-begin. 
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yearly,201 but schools should teach students about sexual 
harassment at least yearly (though not as a regular course of study). 
And it needs to focus on the immediate sexual harassment 
problems students face.202 
B. Supplementing Title IX Liability with Education 
Davis was a good step forward in the effort to address the reality 
of sexual harassment and provide remedies for at least some 
victims, but as this Note has explained, it has not reduced the 
problem’s prevalence in schools. Education will help remedy the 
problems of Davis’s standards and presumptions. Education will 
help prevent sexual harassment in schools and address the 
harassment for which there is no Davis protection. 
1. The Davis standards would be more effective if schools educated 
students about sexual harassment. 
The first Davis standard is actual knowledge.203 Educating 
students about how to report and empowering them to do so would 
lessen concerns about this standard. Likewise, training employees 
to report suspected and known sexual harassment up the ladder to 
the school’s Title IX coordinator would also lessen concerns about 
the actual knowledge standard. 
Step one is to tell students what sexual harassment is.204 The 
next is to tell students who will help them if they are sexually 
harassed. They need to know how to properly report harassment205 
and what will happen when they do.206 Though some uncertainty 
 
 201. See, e.g., A.B. 329, 2015 Leg. (Cal. 2015) (requiring California schools to teach sex 
education classes once in junior high and once in high school). 
 202. See Claire Cain Miller, Sexual Harassment Training Doesn’t Work. But Some Things 
Do, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/ 
upshot/sexual-harassment-workplace-prevention-effective.html (“The most effective 
training, researchers say, is . . . tailored for the particular workplace—a restaurant’s training 
would differ from a law firm’s.”). 
 203. Supra Section I.A. 
 204. Students may not recognize sexual harassment for what it is. Furr, supra note 155; 
Hill & Kearl, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that “sexual harassment is so common for girls 
that many fail to recognize it as sexual harassment”). 
 205. Redmond, supra note 23, at 414–15 (explaining that students and parents do not 
always know whom they are supposed to report sexual harassment to). 
 206. Furr, supra note 155 (explaining that students are unlikely to report because they 
are uncertain of the consequences); Keierleber, supra note 159 (reporting about students 
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about the consequences of reporting is inevitable, the more school 
administrators and teachers explain about the process, the more 
students will trust the adults in the school. 
Education about reporting is helpful not only for victims but 
also for bystanders. Bystander training has proven very effective.207 
Student victims are less likely to report because they are 
intimidated, fear isolation, blame themselves, and downplay what 
happened.208 Their peers may be more likely to report. For example, 
when a substitute teacher berated a fifth-grade boy about how he 
should not be grateful that his two dads were officially adopting 
him, three other students told the substitute teacher to stop and 
eventually left the classroom to get the principal.209 The boy himself 
was afraid to talk about it, but other students were able to tell the 
school what had happened.210 In L.E. v. Lakeland, the coach first 
heard that the student was upset from others, and it was only when 
the coach asked what was wrong that the student told him about 
the sexual assault.211 
Lakeland also demonstrates why schools should train their 
employees about reporting sexual harassment up the ladder. In 
response to hearing that three students sexually assaulted L.E., the 
coach “chastised them for ‘screwing around,’ and had them 
apologize.”212 That was it. The coach did not tell any other school 
employee.213 Had the coach done so, school administrators may 
have responded differently and prevented subsequent 
harassment.214 Instead, the school was sued. 
 
being punished after reporting sexual harassment); Kingkade, supra note 159 (reporting that 
schools punish students of color who report sexual assaults); Stuart, supra note 159 (reporting 
that a school suspended a student who was raped at school). 
 207. Miller, supra note 202; Stefanie K. Johnson, Jessica F. Kirk & Ksenia Keplinger, Why 
We Fail to Report Sexual Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 4, 2016). 
 208. Furr, supra note 155. 
 209. Courtney Tanner, A Utah Substitute Told Fifth Graders That ‘Homosexuality Is Wrong.’ 
She Was Escorted Out After 3 Students Spoke Up., SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 29, 2019), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/education/2019/11/29/utah-substitute-told-th/. 
 210. Id. 
 211. L.E. v. Lakeland Joint Sch. Dist. #272, No. 2:17-cv-00512, 2019 BL 301042, at *1  
(D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2019). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. The school district officially reprimanded the coach for not reporting but retracted 
that reprimand over a year later. Id. at *2. 
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Moreover, when school employees know about the prevalence 
and the consequences of student-on-student sexual harassment, 
they may be more proactive in learning about the harm caused by 
and happening to their own students. They might begin to notice 
the sexual harassment that is happening in their hallways, 
lunchrooms, and classrooms. This may begin to close the gap 
between an actual knowledge standard and a constructive  
notice standard.215 
The next Davis standard is deliberate indifference. If schools 
proactively teach their students and employees about sexual 
harassment, they are far less likely to be deliberately indifferent. As 
school officials implement education plans about sexual 
harassment, those same school officials are likely to be more 
thoughtful and caring in how they manage student-on-student 
sexual harassment because they will also learn more about its 
prevalence, the consequences, and the recommended management. 
A study about bully prevention found that when middle school 
teachers are trained about how to intervene, those teachers  
better handle bully intervention.216 Tailored training about  
student-on-student sexual harassment should likewise help 
teachers respond better. 
Moreover, training may get educators to respond in a manner 
well above the Davis threshold of “clearly unreasonable.”217 More 
robust and timely responses will help protect students in a way 
Title IX liability on its own simply cannot do. 
The third standard is sufficient severity. Education serves two 
primary functions here: (1) to encourage school officials to be 
proactive about all sexual harassment and (2) to decrease  
overall incidents. 
As school officials learn to respond better than the Davis 
deliberate-indifference threshold regarding sufficiently severe 
harassment, they will also likely learn to respond better to all the 
incidents of harassment that are not sufficiently severe for Title IX 
liability. Education that focuses on the real impacts of all sexual 
 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 21–26. 
 216. Dawn Newman-Carlson & Arthur M. Horne, Bully Busters: A Psychoeducational 
Intervention for Reducing Bullying Behavior in Middle School Students, 82 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 
259, 263 (2004). 
 217. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) 
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harassment will encourage school officials to do their part to lessen 
its impacts in their schools. 
Employers have a number of financial reasons to decrease 
workplace sexual harassment, including legal costs, employee 
turnover, increased absences, and reduced productivity.218 With the 
exception of legal costs, the incentives for schools may not be 
financial, but they are similar. Sexual harassment may lead to 
higher rates of absenteeism, lower grades, suicidal ideation, self-
harm, substance abuse, eating disorders, and the feeling that school 
is not safe.219 Presumably, educators would like to prevent as best 
they can such consequences, but they first need to understand that 
this is a real problem with these real effects. 
Students will likely harass each other less if they too understand 
what sexual harassment is and what its consequences are—for both 
them and for victims. A study that compared workplace rates of 
sexual harassment before the #MeToo movement with rates two 
years later found that the most blatant types of harassment 
decreased.220 It explained that the increased scrutiny on sexual 
harassment likely led to this decrease.221 Education will help keep 
 
 218. In the employment context, organizations have a number of financial reasons to 
decrease workplace sexual harassment. See ELYSE SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH & CYNTHIA 
HESS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT WORK: 
UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS (2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ 
IWPR-sexual-harassment-brief_FINAL.pdf (explaining the costs of sexual harassment in  
the workplace.) 
 219. Susan Fineran & Larry Bennett, Teenage Peer Sexual Harassment: Implications for 
Social Work Practice in Education, 43 SOC. WORK 55, 55 (1998) (“Many students report school 
performance difficulties as a result of sexual harassment, including absenteeism, decreased 
quality of schoolwork, skipping or dropping classes, lower grades, loss of friends, tardiness, 
and truancy.”); Chiodo et al., supra note 136, at 246 (“For girls, sexual harassment 
victimization . . . [is] associated with elevated risk of self-harm, suicidal thoughts, 
maladaptive dieting, early dating, substance abuse, and feeling unsafe at school.”). Of 
course, the dissent in Davis acknowledged the consequences for victims but dismissed them 
because bullying generally also negatively affects victims’ education. Davis, 526 U.S. at 678 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The obvious difference is that there are no federal protections from 
bullying in schools and there are federal protections from discrimination on the basis of sex 
in schools. 
 220. Ksenia Keplinger, Stefanie K. Johnson, Jessica F. Kirk & Liza Y. Barnes, Women at 
Work: Changes in Sexual Harassment Between September 2016 and September 2018, PLOS ONE 3, 
6 (July 17, 2019), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone. 
0218313&type=printable. This study did find that some lesser forms of harassment increased 
as backlash to the movement. Id. at 6. 
 221. Id. at 1. 
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up discussion about sexual harassment, which will, in turn, 
decrease the frequency of harassment. 
As schools address sexual harassment—no matter the level  
of severity—students will be better protected even while the  
Davis severity standard continues to apply in only the  
worst circumstances. 
2. Education can help remedy the Davis presumptions. 
While the flawed presumptions may be written into the Davis 
decision, they do not have to continually plague school policy 
regarding sexual harassment. 
Rather than simply accepting sexual harassment as inevitable, 
education will remind school officials that the victims here are 
children and will motivate schools to do what they can to prevent 
sexual harassment. Instead of relying on Title IX liability after the 
fact, education will encourage prevention to ultimately decrease 
the frequency and severity of student-on-student sexual 
harassment. Students will no longer graduate from high school 
without learning what sexual harassment is and why it is a 
problem.222 Rather than saying that children do not know any 
better,223 schools can teach them better. 
The Davis severity standard is not elastic enough to meet 
today’s expectations,224 but education can help cover the difference. 
Rather than asking the courts to find Title IX liability when the 
harassment is something less than what Congress intended to 
address in 1972, we can address the expectations at the frontlines—
the classrooms.   
The #MeToo movement shed light on the barriers to 
reporting.225 Understanding those barriers now, schools can train 
their students and teachers on how to report as bystanders.226 A 
 
 222. See Lu, supra note 4. One reason sexual harassment “prevails in adulthood [is] 
because these behaviors aren’t being addressed in childhood—a pivotal time when kids are 
learning social norms and developing their sense of identity.” Id. See generally Brittney 
Herman, Sexual Education as a Form of Sexual Assault Prevention: A Survey of Sexual Education 
Among States with the Highest and Lowest Rates of Rape, 2020 BYU EDUC. & L.J. (forthcoming 
2020) (on file with author) (arguing that sexual education in K–12 schools decreases states’ 
rates of rape). 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 139–142. 
 224. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 225. See supra text accompanying 153–154. 
 226. Johnson et al., supra note 207. 
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2016 Harvard Business Review study explained that the reasons 
why people do not report sexual harassment—”fear of retaliation, 
the bystander effect,227 and a masculine culture that permits  
sexual harassment”—can be counteracted when organizations 
(1) implement bystander training, (2) develop clearer reporting 
systems, and (3) improve the organization’s culture.228 
Finally, if the law presumes that schools know how to best 
handle sexual harassment, it is time to expect schools to actually 
prevent and remedy sexual harassment. As school officials strive to 
learn more about sexual harassment’s effects on students, they will 
know better how to handle the problem. Robust education and 
training programs in schools will earn the trust courts already 
accord them. More important than the courts’ trust in schools is the 
trust of students, parents, and communities. 
It is high time that schools embrace the recommendations 
proffered by the Department of Education in 2001 to train employees, 
students, and even communities about sexual harassment.229 
C. Implementing Education Programs 
Mandated education about sexual harassment is a more 
palatable solution than rehashing the current liability standards, 
and it would likely be more effective in reducing student-on-
student sexual harassment because students and educators would 
know what sexual harassment is and why it is never okay. While it 
may be easier to create such education requirements independent 
from sex education reform, there remain reasons for hesitancy. Will 
it help? Will it overburden schools? Who is responsible for  
this change? 
Workplaces have sexual harassment training, and research has 
shown that while such training does give workers basic 
information, it can actually make the problem worse by “mak[ing] 
[participants] uncomfortable, prompting defensive jokes, or 
reinforc[ing] gender stereotypes.”230 The last thing schools need is 
a worse sexual harassment problem. However, the reason why 
 
 227. The bystander effect “says that we are less likely to help a victim when others are 
also present.” Id. at 3. 
 228. Id. at 2, 4–5. 
 229. See REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 189. 
 230. Miller, supra note 202 (summarizing research about the effectiveness of sexual 
harassment trainings). 
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such training is often ineffective is because of how it is taught in 
these trainings.231 Training is most effective when it is taught 
frequently and seriously, when it includes information about what 
bystanders should do and about positive behaviors, and when it 
encourages reporting.232 Workplace culture is what makes the 
biggest difference, and training done right can help foster  
that culture.233 
For schools, that basic information is desperately needed. 
Children are often given a pass for their bad behavior because they 
supposedly do not know any better. Basic information can change 
that—at least to some extent. Schools, if they are serious about not 
wanting their students sexually harassed, can provide the type of 
training that is effective. As schools teach what behaviors are 
appropriate and what behaviors are inappropriate and why, the 
schools will be fostering more respectful cultures. 
A lot is already expected from schools. Tacking on another 
thing to their regular programs may overburden schools and 
educators. In Oakland, California, a math teacher left her job 
because she “regularly addressed sexual harassment and assault 
between students,” and it eventually burned her out.234 That 
teacher was noble for taking on that role, and it understandably 
took a toll on her. However, if the effort was organized and 
assigned to the appropriate school officials, that emotional burnout 
would be less—especially if the frequency of harassment 
decreased. Training will take up time and resources, but the 
problem is severe and needs addressing. Children deserve that time 
and those resources. 
School boards should recognize its in their interest and their 
students’ interest to implement such educational training.235 The 
likelihood that schools will be found deliberately indifferent will 
decrease if they have a sexual harassment prevention program,  
and their students will likely be safer and better prepared  
for adulthood. 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. 
 234. Charlie Stuip, Students Drive New Policies as K–12 Sexual Assault Investigations Rise, 
NPR (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/08/08/541670513/students-
pressure-reform-as-k-12-sexual-assault-investigations-rise. 
 235. See supra text accompanying note 218. 
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However, it is unlikely that school boards will implement such 
a program independently, so states236 need to mandate it and see 
that it is actually done. All fifty states currently have some sort of 
anti-bullying law, and all but eight states require bully-prevention 
education,237 and a sexual harassment program can likely be an 
extension of, or patterned after, the existing law. 
It is unknown precisely what the effects of such education 
programs would be. However, teaching students about sexual 
harassment will raise students’ and educators’ recognition of 
sexual harassment and its effects. It will empower students to 
report harassment and seek out victim resources. It will help 
students better navigate schools’ Title IX harassment allegation 
processes. And it will help dismantle the idea that the harassment 
did not matter because they were only kids. 
The solution is victim-centered, but because it aims at 
prevention, all are benefited. Early education about harassment 
and early correction will help train the future college students, 
workforce, and policymakers not to sexually harass others. 
While this Note focused on student-on-student harassment, this 
solution may even help children who have been sexually abused 
outside this context learn how to recognize the abuse for what it is 
and report it.238 
 
 236. The federal government is the last resort. Ultimately, an amendment to Title IX, 
additional Title IX regulations, or additional funding and conditions could establish such a 
requirement. However, a federal education solution would likely be seen as an intrusion into 
matters reserved to states. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 
(1973) (“The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state 
taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various 
States . . . .”). Furthermore, it is likely to be less effective as a federal regulation because the 
federal government does not have the capacity to effectively oversee every school’s 
compliance with Title IX regulations as it is. See supra text accompanying note 196. And 
finally, this is a ripe opportunity for states to “try novel social . . . experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.” See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 237. Laws, Policies & Regulations, STOPBULLYING.GOV, https://www.stopbullying.gov/ 
resources/laws (last reviewed Jan. 7, 2018). All but eleven states require staff training. Id. 
 238. Roffman, supra note 138, at 323. 
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Recognizing liability for a school’s knowing and deliberate 
indifference to severe peer sexual harassment was a starting point 
in addressing the pervasive problem of sexual harassment in 
schools. With all we now know about sexual harassment, we cannot 
afford to leave children so unprotected from it. In addition to the 
Title IX liability established by Davis, every school should 
implement preventive and informative training or educational 
programs about sexual harassment. The time is up for the mistaken 
belief that nothing can be done. 
 
